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Abstract
The central philosophical pillar of the current system of research regulation in the United States
today is that clinical investigators cannot and should not be trusted to protect the interests of the
people whom they recruit to participate in research. That distrust of researchers is coupled with a
starry‐eyed idealism about trustworthiness of clinicians. In my opinion, the distrust of researchers
and the complacency about clinicians are both misplaced. The result of these twin errors is that
people are overprotected in research studies and inadequately protected in clinical care. Patients
outside of research studies are exposed to many types of risks from innovative therapy and from
practice variation. Researchers who try to study these risks in a risk‐reducing way are hampered
by burdensome regulations.
We need a fundamental theoretical and conceptual change. The change would require us to
acknowledge 2 things. First, research can be done in a way that does not harm (and might help)
current patients. Second, researchers as moral agents can balance their moral obligations to
patients with their obligations to science just as clinicians balance their fiduciary obligations to
patients with other interests.
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1 | T HE R E GU LA T I O N OF C LI N I C A L
R E S E A RC H

to protect the interests of the people whom they recruit to participate
in research. It is likely, though difficult to prove, that research subjects
are safer as a result of this system. It is also possible that an unintended
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The heart of research regulation

consequence of the meticulous and sometimes intrusive oversight is
that some ethically justifiable research is delayed or cannot be done

It should not be controversial to claim that our system of research regulation in the United States today is based on a deep distrust of
researchers and the entire research enterprise. This distrust may be
warranted because of past research abuses, including Tuskegee, the
Human Radiation Experiments, the Guatemala syphilis studies, and
the many other unethical studies that were copiously documented by
Beecher in 1966. As a result of these examples of researchers who
put the goals of science ahead of the interests of their research subjects, we have put in place a system of research regulation that is based
on the idea that clinical investigators cannot and should not be trusted
Abbreviations: SUPPORT, Surfactant, Positive‐Pressure, Pulse Oximetry
Randomized Trial; FiO2, Fraction of inspired oxygen.

at all.1-3
In comparison to the distrust of researchers, our current system of
oversight and regulation treats clinicians as much more trustworthy.
This is true even as studies show that, overall, the public's trust in physicians has declined.4
The systems of regulation may not reflect the views of the general
public. According to a Pew Center study, the public trust in medicine
and in research was about the same. For both groups, about 40% of
the public had “a great deal of confidence in the people running these
institutions.”5 But those systems demand meticulous oversight of the
researcher. Researchers must be certified annually as understanding
the ethics of research. Their projects must be reviewed by institutional

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
© 2017 The Authors. Learning Health Systems published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of the University of Michigan

Learn Health Sys. 2018;2:e10048.
https://doi.org/10.1002/lrh2.10048

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/lrh2

1 of 6

2 of 6

LANTOS

review boards (IRBs) before they begin, and any change must be sub-

Researchers cannot be trusted to think rationally, to make moral judg-

mitted to the IRB. By contrast, clinicians are entrusted to decide which

ments, or to distinguish between competing norms and goals.7

therapies to provide and to explain the risks, benefits, and treatment

Contemporary debates about the risks of research, and our system

choices that patients face. Together, clinicians and patients are

of close monitoring by IRBs, suggest that Churchill's view of the moral

thought capable of arriving at optimum treatment choices without

psychology of the clinical investigator is the common view today. The

any outside oversight.

investigator is an idealistic utilitarian; working hard to generate knowl-

The contrast between the 2 is highlighted in situations in which a
clinician wants to study the safety and efficacy of 2 widely available

edge that will help future patients but, in the process, willing to heedlessly and unreflectively sacrifice the interests of present patients.

treatments. That physician could prescribe either of those treatments

Brody and Franklin echo Churchill's view and elaborate on the

without any oversight. But if he wanted to study them, he would no

ways in which the clinician's loyalties allow trust while the researcher's

longer be trusted to independently oversee the choices that his

undermine that trust. They write,

patients made. Instead, he would be seen as having a serious and irreducible conflict of interest that could only be mitigated by IRB oversight. Only the IRB, not the investigator, is empowered to decide
exactly what he could or could not say in describing the study and
seeking the patient's informed consent.
In my opinion, the distrust of researchers and the complacency
about clinicians are both misplaced.
The result of these twin errors is that people are overprotected in
research studies and inadequately protected in clinical care. From an
ethical perspective, or a public health perspective, or a purely economic perspective, we would be better off thinking about a continuum
between clinical care and comparative effectiveness research and
demanding a similar level of oversight for both.

Patients should understand that when they enter a
physician‐patient relationship, what defines this specific
sort of relationship is the overriding commitment of the
physician to that individual patient's benefit. Research
participants form a different sort of relationship with the
professionals in charge. Failing to see the difference
between these two sorts of relationships (however much
they might be blurred or overlap in particular settings)
creates a fundamental problem for protecting patients
or subjects from exploitation.8
Churchill's and Brody's view of the clinician, by contrast, imagines
that the fiduciary responsibilities that the clinician assumes and

To understand the roots of our current system of research regula-

accepts are so powerful as to serve as an adequate protection of the

tion, I will first review the ethical arguments that have buttressed this

patient's interests. A key question, then, is whether this represents

system for the last 5 decades. I will then present some of the counter-

an unrealistic oversimplification of the motives and the moral psychol-

arguments. Finally, to illustrate the dangers of our current overregula-

ogy of both researchers and clinicians. I believe it does. I believe that

tion of research and underregulation of clinical practice, I will discuss 2

researchers can act out of a powerful sense of fiduciary responsibility

recent controversies in research ethics.

by which they want to do what is best for their patient by means of
studying the efficacy of the treatments that they prescribe. Further-
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Deep suspicions have deep roots

The view that researchers cannot be trusted but that clinicians can

more, clinicians can compromise their fiduciary responsibilities if they
exude and communicate unwarranted confidence in their knowledge
of what is best.

comes from a particular understanding of the psychological motivations of each group of professionals. In 1980, Churchill outlined the
argument that has become conventional wisdom about researchers.
He began by noting that clinicians have (or ought to have) one goal,
the best interests of the patient, while researchers have (or ought to

1.3 | An alternative view: Researchers as patient
advocates

have) another, the pursuit of generalizable knowledge. He wrote,

Most clinician‐researchers do not see themselves as urged or com-

“The acknowledged goal of the physician‐patient relationship is healing

pelled in this way. Instead, they see well‐designed human subject

or the health of the patient. The scientific investigator cannot claim

research as entirely harmonious with uncompromised loyalty to the

this goal or the moral authority which goes with it.”6 He saw the 2 rela-

best interests of patients. They see these interests and commitments

tionships as mutually exclusive, “The two relationships have lives of

as complimentary rather than competing.

their own which, by their very nature, compel or urge to certain priorities and inclinations to perceive and act in certain ways.”

Fost, for example, believes that it is unethical to recommend
unproven therapies to patients. He imagines that in conversation with

Churchill's language is strong. The researcher is “compelled” and

a patient about enrolling in a clinical trial, he would say, “My own con-

“urged” to pursue knowledge. These words suggest that the research

science tells me it would not be responsible to give (an unstudied treat-

has no choice, that he is driven by a force as powerful as an addiction.

ment) to you in an uncontrolled way, because neither you, nor I, nor

It is this view of the researcher that has led to the mandate for strict

future patients would ever know whether it helped or hurt.”9

oversight. The researchers' urges are so compelling that he cannot be

Barrington echoes this view. He notes, “I have a fiduciary obliga-

independently accountable for his actions. As Clancy Martin noted,

tion to provide optimal treatment. I also have a moral obligation to

writing about addiction in another context, “It is almost impossible

know what the optimal treatment is. I also, simultaneously, have a

for the addict to learn, to understand, and to remember that he cannot

moral obligation as a researcher to keep trying to find out what the

have his drug.” Following Churchill, this is how we see the researcher.

best treatments may be.”10
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This view, too, has deep roots. Katz was a pioneer of research

is also a researcher, that treatment will be assigned at random, and that

ethics and one of the earliest advocates for patient empowerment,

the intervention will be provided according to a pre‐defined protocol

informed consent, and shared decision‐making. In 1969, he suggest

as opposed to by the choice of the doctor.17 This approach to deciding

that research and therapy overlapped in complex ways, “The multiple

on therapy can threaten the trust that a patient has in his or her doctor.

purposes of medical practice, caring for patients, advancing science,

Loss of trust is a very different sort of risk than is the risk of physical or

improving the health of the community, nations, and future genera-

psychological harm that is directly caused by the study interventions

tions cannot be separated clearly in most decisions that physician

themselves.

investigators have to make. Instead, more often than not, all these pur-

In assessing the importance of these 2 types of risks, it is tempting

poses are present in every decision.” Katz concluded that “research

to simply combine them and to think of them as both contributing

and therapy, pursuit of knowledge and treatment, are not separate

equally to the sum total of risks associated with research. Of late, how-

but intertwined.”11

ever, it has become necessary to disentangle them. The rise of compar-

Toulmin also believed that the researcher was not uniquely con-

ative effectiveness studies and our increasing knowledge of the degree

flicted. Instead, he suggested that all professionals had conflicting obli-

to which widespread practice variation is the norm suggest that 2

gations, “The possibility of internal conflicts of obligation has been

types of risk might pull in opposite directions. That is, an attempt by

built into the practice of medicine ever since the time of Hippocrates,

a clinical investigator to honestly disclose the truths about practice

whose oath had the physician swear to serve, not merely his immedi-

variation to quantify the relative risks of randomization could lead to

ate patient, but also ‘the art.’ At the present time, this conflict shows

decrements in trust. On the other hand, deceptively withholding infor-

up in the moral quandaries attending the conduct of random clinical

mation about the true degree and nature of a doctor's uncertainty

trials.”12

could lead to increased trust and psychological well‐being.

Passamani sees these overlapping roles as a way to “protect phy-

But here's the problem: if increased trust requires decreased

sicians and their patients from therapies that are ineffective or toxic.”

transparency and honesty, than it is not necessarily a good thing. Sim-

Grunberg and Cefalu posit that the alternative to such clinical research

ilarly, decreased trust that results from a physicians' greater honesty

is not individualized and thus better patient care but merely the

about uncertainty might be a good thing. Patients should be wary of

pretense of omniscience that physicians do not and cannot

unstudied treatments. False reassurance, in such situations, does not

13

empower patients or promote autonomy.

possible have.

We ought to require full disclosure about what we know and do

1.4
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How these theories play out in the real world

not know for both research and for clinical treatment.
The Surfactant, Positive‐Pressure, Pulse Oximetry Randomized

A recent controversy about a study of oxygen therapy for premature

Trial (SUPPORT study) randomized extremely premature babies to 2

babies illustrates the controversies.14 The debate has implications the

target levels of oxygen saturation. Researchers wanted to determine

development of learning healthcare systems.15 It focuses on the ways

whether different oxygen levels were associated with different rates

that we think about and inform patients about the risks of different

of retinopathy, chronic lung disease, or neurodevelopmental prob-

treatments or the risks of studies to evaluate those treatments.

lems.18 There was widespread uncertainty about the effect of different

The controversy focused on a particular type of research, namely,

oxygen levels on all of these outcomes.19 There was well‐known prac-

research on therapies that are in widespread use and about which

tice variation at the time when the study was implemented.20

there is known variation in physicians' practices. This type of research

Researchers believed that because all of the oxygen levels that were

has been called “research on medical practices” or “comparative effec-

used in the study were within the range of oxygen levels that were rec-

tiveness research.” In such studies, all treatments that are offered in a

ommended by experts at the time, the risks associated with enrollment

trial are also readily available outside the trial and, thus, all of the treat-

in the study were minimal.21 Federal regulators and many other critics

ments are available to patients whether they are in a study or not.

of the study disagreed.22

Often, it is unclear when or how doctors decide to use one or another

As it turned out, there were differences in retinopathy and mortal-

of these therapies, both of which are considered to be within the stan-

ity between the 2 arms of the study. Babies in the lower oxygen arm

dard of care. Comparative effectiveness research is designed to deter-

had less retinopathy (17% vs. 8%) but higher mortality (20% vs. 16%).

mine whether there are clear differences between such therapies.

Rates of lung disease and neurodevelopmental impairment were not

In these situations, there are, broadly speaking, 2 ways to think

different.23 Compared to babies who were eligible for the study but

about risk. One way is to focus on the measurable physical or psycho-

not enrolled, babies in the study had lower rates of severe retinopathy

logical risks that are associated with the procedures, interventions, or

(13.3% vs. 24.1%) and mortality (17.6% vs. 24%).24 Investigators

drugs that are used for the patients who become research subjects in

believed that these results confirmed their beliefs that the being in

the actual trial. Those risks can be compared between the 2 arms

the study was less risky than not being in the study and that the study's

within the trial. Such trials also allow comparison of risks between all

surprise finding of a lower mortality in the high‐oxygen arm was an

patients in the trial (regardless of which treatment they receive) and

unexpected and very important additional discovery.

patients who are not in the trial who are receiving the study treat16

The federal Office for Human Research Protection claimed in its

The other way to think about risk

2013 Determination Letter that neither the actual physical risks nor

focuses on the less quantifiable risks that are associated with being

the better outcomes associated with participation in the study were

involved in a research protocol itself: the fact that the patient's doctor

the primary focus of their analysis of risk. Instead, they opined, such

ments in a nonrandom way.
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research is inherently risky because of the nature of the relationship
that the clinical investigators had with the study subjects, ie the “risk
of randomization”: taking the choice of therapy out of the individual
clinicians' hands (who was presumably acting in the patients' best
interests) and submitting it to the researcher (who was presumably acting in the best interests of the pursuit of knowledge). Echoing
Churchill, Miller, and Brody, Office for Human Research Protection
wrote, “Ultimately, the issues in this case come down to a fundamental
difference between the obligations of clinicians and those of
researchers. Doctors are required, even in the face of uncertainty, to
do what they view as being best for their individual patients.
Researchers do not have that same obligation.”25 Bioethicists Macklin
and Shepherd agreed, “It is the doctors, not the researchers, who have
a fiduciary obligation and long‐standing ethic to pursue the patient's
best interests above all other considerations.”26 Annas, an expert in
health law, echoed this view, “A physician must be guided by a fiduciary obligation to the patient. A researcher has no such obligation.”27
By this view, babies in the SUPPORT study were at higher risk than
those not in the study, regardless of their actual outcomes, because
the nature of their relationship with the clinician‐investigators put
them at risk.
Such relational concerns about the risks to research subjects are

LANTOS
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Is the clinician really so unconflicted?

This dichotomous view of the moral psychology of clinician and
investigator assumes that patients get the best care when their doctor
exercises individual clinical judgment. That assumption is undermined
by robust data on the randomness of practice variation. From studies
by Wennberg and others,29 we now know that clinical practice varies
widely between doctors, between hospitals,30 and between regions
of the country.31 Furthermore, the variation has no plausible basis in
evidence about improved outcomes.32 These variations can be studied
to determine which treatments led to the best outcomes at the lowest
cost. Many healthcare systems now take this approach. They analyze
electronic health record data for quality assessments, quality
improvement initiatives, and system redesign projects, both across
the system and within individual medical centers. Such activities are
generally retrospective, but they can be combined with prospective
studies to yield more precise information. They raise the question,
however, of whether they require the sort of regulation that we
currently mandate for research. Such activities also illustrate the ways
in which our current dichotomized view of the loyal, patient‐focused
clinician and the conflicted, research‐oriented investigator is destined
to crumble.

based on a vague, subjective fear, based on often inaccurate normative
presumptions, about a type of risk that is unquantifiable and therefore
can never be thought of as minimal.

1.6
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Problems with research regulation today

Now, of course, nobody could know the outcome of the study

One of the ironies of our current approaches is that it allows the clini-

when it was designed. All they could do was make their best, educated

cian tremendous latitude to withhold important information from

guess about the reasonably foreseeable risks that might accrue to par-

patients. The physician who assures her patient that “Doctor knows

ticipants as a result of being in the study. At the outset, then, the

best” in a situation in which there is significant professional uncertainty

researchers were of the opinion that there were no increased risks to

about what is best misleads her patient. Imagine a neonatologist caring

babies in the study compared to babies who were not in the study.

for a patient at the time of the SUPPORT study. A consensus among

They said that in the consent form. As it turned out, they were correct.

the experts was that we did not know what was best. A doctor who

One might ask whether their confidence in this outcome was war-

assures her patient that she does, in fact, know what is best is deceiv-

ranted, or whether, instead, the consent form should have said that

ing either herself, her patient, or both. Respect for patient autonomy

study participation had higher risks than nonparticipation. That would

and the obligations to inform the patient of treatment options would

not have been honest (they did not believe it to be true) and, as it

demand that a responsible and nonpaternalistic practitioner would

turned out (though nobody could have known this for sure at the out-

inform the patient of the disagreement in the professional community

set), would have been inaccurate.

that led to the need for a rigorous trial. Not to do so will result in 2

To some, it was simply inconceivable that clinicians did not know the

things. First, clinical trials will continue to be viewed as ethically prob-

best level of oxygen to use. Carome stated this deep‐seated belief suc-

lematic compared to treatment based on clinical judgment. Second, we

cinctly, “It is inconceivable that in 2005, highly trained, expert neonatol-

will be left with retrospective data from the “natural experiments” of

ogists providing routine individualized care outside the research context

idiosyncratic practice variation rather than the better data that we

did not adjust FiO2 levels to achieve different oxygen saturation levels —

might derive from rigorously designed clinical trials.

in different babies and at different times for the same baby — within the

The view that clinician‐investigators have divided loyalties and

broad range of 85‐95% based on important clinical indicators of tissue

that “pure” clinicians do not is also naïve about the demands on clini-

oxygenation.” He imagined that such decisions would follow “consulta-

cians. As Wendler noted, “Clinicians have a number of appropriate

tions with parents regarding balancing of specific risks”28 thereby

interests that compete with providing the best care possible, including

allowing for parent preference and clinician knowledge—both acting in

earning a living, helping other patients, conserving the resources of the

the best interests of the baby—to guide the choice of oxygen level.

institutions where they work, and training new clinicians.”33

Although Carome found this “inconceivable,” it was, in fact, the

Interestingly, patients and research subjects seem to be ahead of

standard approach to the treatment of premature babies outside the

the regulators in understanding these issues. In both domains, they

study protocol. Each neonatal intensive care unit determined a target

are pushing the boundaries of the permissible. With the help of social

oxygen saturation and then adjusted the levels of oxygen provided to

media, wearable devices, and other methods of organizing and commu-

keep babies within the target range, just as they did on the study

nicating, patients and research subjects are taking matters into their

protocol.

own hands. Disease‐specific websites and advocacy groups have
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humbled leading hospitals in the United States and around the world

theoretical and conceptual one. Unless we acknowledge that research

by organizing social media campaigns to force doctors to disclose more

can be done in a way that does not harm (and might help) current

than they otherwise would have and to change hospital policies and

patients and will improve the care of future patients and that

clinical practices.34,35 Furthermore, citizens are developing their own

researchers might be able to balance their moral obligations to those

36,37

independent research enterprises.

patients and to the scientific work that they are doing, then merely fid-

There are many risky innovations in modern medicine. Those

dling with the regulations and definitions, in ways designed to carve

should be studied. Studying will make them safer. They can be studied

out the most uncontroversial low‐risk studies, will not address the cen-

in ways that do not increase risk. If they are not studied, then we will

tral tension in clinical research ethics today.

never know which are the safest and the most effective. We need to
improve the rigor with which patients are informed about the risks of
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unstudied and nonvalidated therapies that are part of routine clinical
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practice. This could be done by, for example, mandating that patients
who are eligible for comparative effectiveness studies but who choose
not to enroll be given the same information as those who choose to
enroll, with an accurate description of the risks of both choices.
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What's love got to do with it?

The debate between these 2 views of the clinical investigator has
implications for the way we regulate research. If the clinical investigator is viewed as reflective, trustworthy, and capable of maintaining his
primary commitment to the patient's well‐being, even when the
patient is enrolled in a research study, then assessment of the risks
of research will focus only on the risks of the study procedures themselves. If, on the other hand, the investigator is seen as unable to disentangle his conflicting loyalties and as inevitably prioritizing the
goals of research over the goals of patient care, then careful and constant oversight will be necessary.
Our current system of research regulation reflects the latter view.
It treats researchers as incapable of making even simple moral judgments about study design, patient enrollment, informed consent, or
even data analysis.
Ironically, then, researchers are overseen by committees made up
primarily of other researchers. (IRBs must also include at least one nonscientific person, but, since IRBs make decisions by majority vote, the
balance of power will always lie with the researchers.) Thus, people
who are not thought capable of supervising themselves when they
do research become IRB members who are thought to be capable of
learning and applying rules for the responsible conduct of research.
The irony of this sort of self‐governance by people who are not
thought capable of governing themselves illustrates the absurdity of
the sharp distinction between clinical research and medical practice.
The distinction blurs, rather than sharpens, the classification of people
whose interests are at risk because of innovative medical practices. It
reflects a view that research subjects need protection in ways that
patients do not and that doctors take their fiduciary responsibilities
seriously in a way that researchers cannot.
This curious view of the dichotomy between research and practice
leads to a system in which patients are exposed to many types of risks
from innovative therapy and from practice variation. Researchers who
try to study the risks of such clinical care are engaged in activities that
often cause no reasonably foreseeable risk to patients. Nevertheless,
they are hampered by burdensome regulations. Many people have proposed changes to the regulations to carve out exceptions for areas of
low‐risk research. The fundamental change needed, however, is a
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